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Issue: Whether Section 505 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which requires cable
television operators to fully scramble channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming during the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., violates the First Amendment.
Holding: The Supreme Court found Section
505 a content-based restriction on speech and
that less restrictive means were available to
achieve the government's objectives.
Discussion: Section 505 of the CDA requires
cable operators to entirely block signal bleed on
channels where the content is primarily dedicated
to sexually oriented programming. Or, in the alternative, operators are required to restrict such
programming to the hours between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. Signal bleed is the viewable and/or audible
portion of the signal for which the subscriber has
not paid.
Appellee Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
challenged the statute as a content-based restriction that was violative of the First Amendment.
Congress' purpose in enacting Section 505 was to
shield children from hearing or seeing sexually
oriented programming resulting from signal
bleed between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
The government argued that cable operators
often inadequately scramble programming; therefore, children can either hear or see portions of
the programming. In addition, the government
argued that many adults themselves would find
the material highly offensive, and that the material comes unwanted into homes where children
might see or hear it against parental consent. Nevertheless, the Court determined Section 505 was a
content-based restriction deserving strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment, because the statute
defined the speech by its content.
The Court found that a substantial number of
cable operators chose to blackout channels containing sexually oriented programming for twothirds of the day in every home regardless of the
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presence or likely presence of children, and at the
request of viewers. The Court held that the statute
did not pass strict scrutiny, because there is a plausible, less restrictive alternative found in Section
504 of the CDA. Section 504 requires a cable operator, "upon request by a cable service subscriber
...without charge, [to] fully scramble or otherwise fully block" any channel the subscriber does
not wish to receive. The Court found, "Even upon
the assumption that the [g]overnment has an interest in substituting itself for informed and empowered parents, its interest is not sufficiently
compelling to justify this widespread restriction
on speech." The Court found against the government because it failed to show that Section 505
was not the least restrictive means for addressing a
compelling interest.
TIME WARNER

ENTERTAINMENT

CO.

V.

211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the "subscriber limits provision"
and the "channel occupancy provision" of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "Cable Act") are constitutional.
Holding: The court held that both provisions of
the Cable Act were constitutional, and thus reversed in part and affirmed in part the lower
court's ruling. The court held that both provisions were content neutral, and each provision
sought to protect competition and therefore advanced an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech.
Discussion: Time Warner and other cable television system owners challenged the constitutionality of the subscriber limits provision and the channel occupancy provision of the Cable Act. The
subscriber limits provision restricts the number of
subscribers a cable operator can reach. Similarly,
the channel occupancy provision restricted the
amount of programming in which a cable operator may have a financial interest. The district
court ruled that the subscriber limits provision
and the channel occupancy provision were unUNITED STATES
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constitutional. The circuit court held that both
provisions were content neutral. The Cable Act
was enacted to protect the availability of outlets
for unpopular speech. The court accepted the
government's argument that the subscriber limits
provision protected against market concentration
that would threaten competition and the diversity
of speech. Likewise, the channel occupancy provision protects against the possible anti-competitive
effect of vertically integrated program suppliers.
Vertically integrated program suppliers have incentives to favor affiliated cable operators over
unaffiliated cable operators at the consumer's expense and therefore would decrease the diversity
of speech.
MCI WORLDCOM, INC. V. FCC 209 F.3d 760
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the Federal Communications
Commission ("the Commission" or "FCC") improperly ordered the mandatory detariffing of interexchange carriers in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act").
Holding: The court denied a petition for review
of the FCC's mandatory detariffing decision.
Discussion: Petitioners sought review of the FCC
order prohibiting them from filing tariffs with the
Commission. Section 203(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act") required telecommunication carriers to file tariffs with the FCC to ensure that the carriers were charging consumers
reasonable prices. The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 mandates the FCC avoid applying any regulation or provision to a carrier that the FCC determines is unnecessary for consumer protection,
or is not needed to guard against discrimination
or other improper acts. Thus, the 1996 Act permits the FCC to dispense with Section 203(a) of
the Act. The court held that no provision of the
Act provided carriers with a right to file tariffs,
and the FCC was no longer obligated to accept
such filings. The Commission argued voluntary filings would undermine the increased competitive
effect of detariffing and should be forbidden. The
court ruled that the Commission's desire to emulate a free market and move toward an unregulated environment were reasonable enough to
substantiate its ruling.

AT&T
LANTA

WIRELESS PCS, INC. V. CITY OF AT-

210 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000).

Issue: Whether the 1996 Act contains a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude a separate
cause of action to enforce the 1996 Act under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Holding: The court of appeals held that the Section 1983 remedies are available, and vacated and
remanded the case.
Discussion: A provider of personal wireless service sued the City of Atlanta for denial of a special
use permit, and sought compensatory damages
pursuant to Section 1983 and a violation of the
1996 Act. The Northern District Court for the District of Georgia issued mandamus but denied relief under Section 1983. AT&T Wireless received a
special administrative permit to provide personal
wireless service in Atlanta. Section 1983 provides
remedies for both constitutional violations as well
as a broad remedy for violations of federally created rights. These remedies are not available,
however, in actions for violations of all federal
statutes.
The 1996 Act permits any person adversely affected by state or local action to sue in any court
of competentjurisdiction, and binds the state and
local governments to refrain from discrimination.
Therefore, the Telecommunications Act was intended to create a federal right. However, the
1996 Act contains an express directive that it
would not have any implied effect upon any other
laws other than those specifically provided for
within the act itself. As the Telecommunications
Act contained only express exclusions regarding
tax and antitrust laws, AT&T could pursue remedies under Section 1983.
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205 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a local zoning board's denial of
a special use permit for the construction of a wireless communications tower is in violation of the
1996 Act.
Holding: The 1996 Act cannot require a county
to grant a zoning permit under the Tenth Amendment because it would be directing local governments to employ federal standards when zoning.
Discussion: A telecommunications provider applied for a conditional use permit to the zoning
administrator to erect a wireless communications
tower. The local board voted unanimously to deny
the permit. The provider claimed that the board's
COUNTY
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actions violated Section 704(a) of the Telecommunications Act, which prevents barriers to entry.
Residents opposed the construction of the tower
out of fear of children climbing the tower, the
possibility that pilots may confuse the lights on
the tower and the lights at a nearby airport, and
the possibility that the tower may suffer structural
difficulties and collapse. The court found that the
residents' concerns for the construction were unreasonable. Nevertheless, the 1996 Act violates the
Tenth Amendment by coercing the local governments to apply federal rules in zoning and land
use.

TCG DETROIT V. CITY OF DEARBORN 206
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a city's requirement that a proposed telecommunications provider pay the city a
franchise fee for the privilege of laying fiber optic
cable is a violation of the 1996 Act.
Holding: The franchise fee that a proposed telecommunications provider was forced to pay was
fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
Discussion: TCG, a proposed telecommunications provider, negotiated with the city to lay
twenty-seven miles of cable in the city and pay a
one time fee to reimburse the city for administrative costs. The city backed away from the negotiations and required a franchise fee. TCG claims
that the city's demand for a franchise fee was in
violation of Section 253 of the 1996 Act, which requires removal of barriers to entry. The court
held that the franchise fee was reasonable and
competitively neutral. When determining whether
the fee was fair and reasonable, the court considered the amount of wire the company planned to
lay, the amount other providers were willing to
pay and the fact that TCG had agreed previously
to a fee almost identical to the one the city is now
charging.
FREEMAN V. BURLINGTON

INC., D/B/A/

BROADCASTERS,

WINZ 204 F.3d 311 (2nd Cir. 2000).

Issue: Whether a city zoning administration can
hold a radio station operator, cellular phone company, and a city fire and ambulance service in violation of city ordinances for interfering with electronic devices in private homes.
Holding: The federal government regulates radio frequency interference and therefore city or-

dinances governing radio frequency are preempted by federal law.
Discussion: A radio station, cellular phone company, and a city fire and ambulance service were
all in violation of a broadcast tower permit condition. The city, however, did not have the authority
to enforce the permit condition because radio frequency interference is governed by federal law.
Federal law preempts the city ordinance. The
court considered Congress' intent when enacting
the law to determine whether Congress left room
for states to supplement the federal regulation.
The federal law preempted the field of radio frequency interference because the statute grants
the FCC broad authority over the issue. Also, the
legislative history of the 1982 Amendments to the
Act lends support that Congress intended to grant
the FCC exclusive power to regulate.

KNIGHTS OF THE

Ku KLux KLAN V. CURA-

TORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

203

F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether a state Ku Klux Klan and its coordinator's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when a state university's curators and the general manager of a not-for-profit
public broadcast radio station denied the Klan's
application to underwrite radio programming.
Holding: The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the station's underwriting acknowledgments were governmental speech
on the part of the university. The underwriting
program was immune from First Amendment forum analysis, which requires that censorship of
speech be adequately related to matters of editorial or journalistic discretion. Also, the court determined that the forum analysis was not applicable just because the university created an
underwriting program.
Discussion: The court rejected the Ku Klux
Klan's forum argument because the radio station's underwriting acknowledgments were governmental speech on behalf of the University.
The central purpose of the enhanced underwriting program is not to promote the views of the
donors, but to acknowledge any consideration accepted by the station with respect to the broadcast. Therefore, the station's underwriting acknowledgments are federally mandated
sponsorship identifications. In effect, by accepting
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or rejecting the funds of underwriters, the station
is making a governmental decision whether to
speak or remain silent.
The court also found that even if a forum analysis had applied, the station had editorial discretion about what material to broadcast, which included underwriting acknowledgments. Because
accepting funds from the Ku Klux Klan would
trigger statutorily mandated publication, the university used its editorial discretion to reject the
proposed sponsorship, choosing to remain silent.
Finally, the court found that the university instituted the underwriting program to gather financial support for the station and to briefly identify
its underwriters, not to communicate the views of
its underwriters.
ALLENCO, INC. V. FCC 201 F.3d 608 (5th Cir.
2000).
Issue: Whether two orders issued by the FCC,
promulgated to satisfy Congress' dual mandates
to provide universal service and inject competition into the market for local telephone service,
were in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act and the Takings Clause, and in noncompliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Holding: The court of appeals denied the petitions for review, finding that the petitioner's local
telephone service providers fundamentally misconstrued the primary purpose of the 1996 Act,
which intended to provide competition in local
telephone service markets while continuing to
pursue the goal of universal service.
Discussion: The court rejected the petitions of
the local exchange carriers, holding that the 1996
Act was meant to introduce competition into the
market and does not guarantee economic success
for all providers. In addition, the court noted that
the promise of universal service requires sufficient
funding for customers, not providers. The petitioners did not demonstrate that various changes
to the universal support fund for high-cost loops
failed to provide sufficient funding for universal
service. They also failed to show that the changes
in the treatment of charges paid by interexchange
carriers unreasonably failed to provide sufficient
and explicit funding for universal service. The
court rejected petitioner's takings clause challenge as premature. Finally, the court held that
the FCC's orders complied with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.

CELLULAR PHONE TASKFORCE

v. FCC 205

F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Issue: Whether the FCC acted lawfully in
promulgating guidelines for health and safety
standards for radio frequency radiation.
Holding: The court upheld the regulations,
finding that the FCC acted reasonably by relying
on the health and safety standards for radio frequency radiation issued by the American National
Standards Institute and National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements in setting the
guidelines.
Discussion: In upholding the regulations, the
court held that the FCC acted within its discretion
to not require operators to submit new evidence
to other federal agencies in the environmental assessment area. Rather, the FCC could reasonably
expect those agencies to keep abreast of recent
developments in carrying out their missions. The
court further held that the FCC's actions were not
arbitrary or capricious in exempting certain licensees from filing routine environmental assessments or in setting maximum permitted exposure
levels. Finally, the court found that the FCC was
not required under the National Environmental
Policy Act to prepare an environmental impact
statement. The agency reasonably interpreted the
preemption provision of the 1996 Act, and the
preemption provision did not violate the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution.
BELL ATLANTIC

TELEPHONE

Co. v. FCC

206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Issue: The court faced the question of whether
calls made to an Internet Service Provider ("ISP")
are local or long distance. The 1996 Act established reciprocal compensation for local exchange carriers ("LECs") so that both the originator and recipient receive payment for the call.
The FCC limited the scope of reciprocal compensation to local calls only. For this reason, if calls to
ISPs are found to be long distance, compensation
need not be reciprocated. Utilizing an end-to-end
analysis, the FCC determined that because the nature of the internet is international and therefore,
many calls will extend beyond state borders, calls
to ISPs are nonlocal.
Holding: Finding an inadequate explanation
for the FCC's determination that calls to ISPs are
nonlocal, the court vacated the ruling and remanded the case. It noted that simply because
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there are further communications after the call
reaches the ISP does not mean that the original
call cannot terminate at the ISP, making the call
local. The FCC must further explain why it is necessary to view the transaction as one continuous
call momentarily pausing en route, rather than
multiple calls terminating at each destination.
Discussion: To reach its decision, the court
closely examined the FCC's choice of an end-toend analysis and the application thereof. Such
analysis is typically utilized to decide jurisdictional
questions. Its application to the instant question is
inappropriate.
In fact, calls to ISPs do not fit neatly within the
idea of local or long-distance calls. The court suggested that possibly the most logical way of looking at an ISP is as a "communications intensive
business end user selling a product to other consumer and business end users." Given the fact that
on prior occasions the FCC admitted that ISPs are
not easily categorized and that the classifications
present conflicts with earlier statements, the court
felt that the FCC needed to clarify its rationale.
GTE SERVICE

CORP. V. FEDERAL COMMUNI-

205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
Issue: The petitioners in this case are incumbent LECs who challenge definitions of the terms
"necessary" and "physical collocation" within the
FCC's Collocation Order pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 (c) (6). The central issue in this case is
whether the FCC's interpretation of the statute
can withstand judicial scrutiny. The statute provides that incumbent LECs must "provide for
physical collocation of equipment necessary for
interconnection or access to unbundled network
CATIONS COMMISSION

elements at the premises of the local exchange
carrier."
Holding: The court determined that the FCC's
definitions of "necessary" and "physical collocation" are impermissibly broad and vacated those
parts of the opinion. It rejected the arguments
that the definition of "premises" is overbroad, that
"physical collocation" was meant to be limited to
"cageless collocation" or that the cost recovery
mechanism requires incumbent LECs to "pay" to
have their property taken.
Discussion: Interpreting the term "necessary,"
the FCC states that an incumbent LEC may not
refuse collocation of any equipment that is "used
or useful" in meeting the statute's mandate. Additionally, the Collocation Order provides that it is
immaterial whether the equipment includes "enhanced capabilities or other functionalities." By
examining Supreme Court precedent, the court
determined that Congress meant to use the plain
meaning of "necessary." The FCC ignores the natural language in favor of efficiency, which it may
not do.
In contrast, the FCC's understanding of "physical collocation" is not overly broad. Because Congress chose not to define terms within the section,
and there is no suggestion of prohibition, the
court found the requirement of cageless collocation availability reasonable.
The court did, however, find the regulation requiring the incumbent LEC to allow the competitor to choose their location within the LEC's
property indefensible. Because the FCC could not
furnish a sensible reason for requiring a LEC to
give up property rights, the court determined that
it might result in an unnecessary taking.

